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Federal Courts-RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-POSTJUDGMENT 
MOTION TO INTERVENE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Is T ~ ~ ~ ~ y - U n i t e d  Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 
(1977). 
Prior to 1968 United Airlines required as an employment 
condition that  its stewardesses, but not its stewards, remain 
unmarried. Carole Romasanta filed a federal class action on be- 
half of herself and all other United stewardesses discharged under 
the no-marriage rule, alleging that the rule violated Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' The district court held that the class 
of eligible stewardesses failed to meet the numerosity require- 
ment of Rule 23(a)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 and 
ordered the suit to continue as an individual a ~ t i o n . ~  Relying on 
the factually similar case of Sprogis v. United Air Lines, I ~ c . , ~  the 
district court later awarded summary judgment for Romasanta 
granting reinstatement and backpay. Thereafter, the parties 
eventually settled on the amounts of backpay to be a ~ a r d e d , ~  and 
the district court dismissed the action with prejudice. 
Eighteen days after the district court's d i~missa l ,~  Liane 
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified a t  42 U.S.C. § §  2000e to 
2000e-15 (1970)). Specifically, g 703(a)(l) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970), was 
alleged to have been violated. 
2. Rule 23(a)(l) requires that a class action may only be maintained if "the class is 
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." 
3. The district court felt that only those stewardesses who had previously filed griev- 
ances under United's collective-bargaining agreement or who had filed charges under a 
fair employment statute were eligible to participate in a civil action. See Romasanta v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). The court, however, did permit 12 former steward- 
esses to intervene " 'by way of joinder as additional parties plaintiff.' " Id. 
Before a civil action may be filed under Title VII, the plaintiff must first ordinarily 
file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(e) (1970). In deciding the instant case, however, the Supreme Court stated that 
relief under Title VII may be granted on a class basis without requiring that unnamed 
class members exhaust administrative procedures. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
U.S. a t  385, 389 n.6 (1977). 
The district court had certified for appeal its order striking the class allegations in 
Romasanta's complaint. The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to grant leave to  appeal 
the "interlocutory" order. 537 F.2d at  917 n.3; see 432 U.S. a t  388-89 n.4; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 
1292 (1970) (providing for discretionary appeal of interlocutory orders). 
4. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U S .  991 (1971). Sprogis was an individ- 
ual action, not a class action. 
5. The district court appointed a special master to recommend each plaintiff's com- 
pensation. In determining damages, the parties followed guidelines used in Sprogis. In 
Sprogis, the special master had recommended that the plaintiff be awarded over $10,000 
in damages. The district court had approved that award, and the Seventh Circuit af- 
firmed. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc.. 517 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1975) (appeal from 
district court's judgment approving master's report with respect to damages). 
6. This was well within the 30-day period allowed for appeals. See FED. R. APP. P. 
4(a). 
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Buix McDonald, a putative member of the class defined in the 
original Romasanta complaint, moved to intervene solely to ap- 
peal the court's denial of class certification. Her motion, filed 
three years after class status had first been denied and long after 
the applicable limitations period had expired, was adjudged un- 
timely by the district court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, hold- 
ing that the district court erred in finding the motion to intervene 
untimely.' The appellate court also reversed the district court 
order denying class status, holding that exhaustion of administra- 
tive procedures was not neces~ary.~ 
United petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari solely to challenge the ruling on the timeliness 
of McDonald's postjudgment application for intervention? The 
Supreme Court granted the petition and affirmed, holding that 
McDonald's motion to intervene was timely and should have 
been granted. 
Intervention in the federal courts is governed by Rule 24 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.lo Rule 24 provides both for 
intervention of right and for permissive intervention. In general, 
where "the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede [an applicant's] ability to protect [his inter- 
est] relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action," he has a right to intervene under Rule 24(a). On 
7. 537 F.2d at 917-19. 
8. Id. a t  919-20; see note 3 supra. 
9. United did not contest either the holding that its no-marriage rule violated Title 
VII or the Seventh Circuit's decision on the merits of the class certification issue. 432 U.S. 
at 391. 
10. Rule 24 provides: 
(a) Intervention of Right. 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an ac- 
tion: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to 
intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property 
or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability 
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented 
by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. 
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an ac- 
tion: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to 
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have 
a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion the court 
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adju- 
dication of the rights of the original parties. 
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the other hand, "when an applicant's claim or defense and the 
main action have a question of law or fact in common," the court 
a t  its discretion may permit him to intervene under Rule 24(b). 
Rule 24(b) also states that "[iln exercising its discretion, the 
court should consider whether the intervention will unduly delay 
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." 
A. Timeliness and Rule 24 
Rule 24 requires that the applications for both intervention 
of right and permissive intervention be timely made." Although 
the rule does not indicate when an application will be timely, the 
Supreme Court has held that whether intervention be of right or 
permissive, timeliness is to be determined from all the circum- 
stances "by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; un- 
less that discretion is abused, the court's ruling will not be dis- 
turbed on review."12 Although Rule 24 specifically directs the 
court to exercise its discretion only in passing on motions for 
permissive intervention,13 the timeliness requirement applies to 
motions for intervention of right as well as for permissive inter- 
vention; courts may thus use their discretion in ruling on motions 
to intervene as of right.14 Even an application for intervention of 
right may be held untimely in the exercise of the court's discre- 
tion, and such determination will not be disturbed on review 
unless that discretion is abused. The courts, however, may be less 
strict in adjudging the timeliness of interventions of right than in 
determining the timeliness of permissive interventions.15 
11. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973). 
12. Id. at  366 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the exercise of the trial court's discre- 
tion must be viewed "in the liberal atmosphere of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are 
to be construed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac- 
tion.' " McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting FED. 
R. CIV. P. 1). 
13. The discretion granted the courts in the last sentence of Rule 24(b) is not limited 
to the timeliness determination. Timeliness is a separate requirement of both subsections 
(a) and (b) of Rule 24. The last sentence of Rule 24(b) seems to give the courts added 
discretionary authority over permissive Rule 24(b) interventions. As a practical matter, 
however, not much is added by this sentence. The criteria of delay or prejudice mentioned 
in the last sentence of Rule 24(b) are the principal criteria used in applying the timeliness 
requirement of both subsections (a) and (b). 
14. See McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. United States Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir. 1977); Nevilles v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 511 F.2d 303,305 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Kozak 
v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1960). 
15. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., 515 F.2d 
946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970). 
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Since the enactment of Rule 24, courts have applied various 
criteria in passing on the timeliness of intervention, including 
prejudice to existing parties resulting from the delay in moving 
to intervene16 or from defending against stale claims,17 the neces- 
sity of the intervention to preserve the applicant's rights,18 the 
length of time the applicant knew of his interest in the suit with- 
out acting,lg the extent to which discovery and other pretrial ac- 
tivity would have to be repeated for the i n t e rven~r ,~~  and the 
purpose for which intervention is sought.21 The interaction of 
these criteria and the various weights given each one depend 
heavily on the factual circumstances of each case and the courts' 
perception of the proper balance among the interests of the origi- 
nal parties, the proposed intervenor, and the A motion 
to intervene made before much discovery or actual trial of the 
issues has occurred will usually be granted even though consider- 
able time has passed since the complaint was filed.23 On the other 
hand, where intervention is sought just prior to or anytime after 
final judgment, the potential for both inconvenience to the court 
and prejudice to existing parties suggests that intervention will 
be less readily granted.24 
Despite its lateness, there are several situations where post- 
judgment intervention has often been granted. Postjudgment 
intervention has been allowed for purposes of appealing the ac- 
tion, especially where the original party stands in a representative 
relationship to the intervenor and either refuses to appeal or stops 
16. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1970); Diaz v. South- 
ern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1125 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Smith 
Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1115 (5th Cir. 1970). 
17. McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977). 
18. See McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970); Wolpe v. 
Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944). 
19. Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Tipco, Inc., 
554 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975). 
20. See Iowa State Univ. Research Foundation, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 459 F.2d 447 
(8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1125 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. 
Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1116 (5th Cir. 1970). 
21. Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
22. See McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970); Kennedy, 
Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329, 330 (1969). The 
public's interest is generally in judicial economy. 
23. See Note, Intervention of Private Parties Under Federal Rule 24, 52 COLUM. L. 
Fhv. 922, 929 (1952). 
24. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970). See 3B 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE fi 24.13[1], a t  24-526 & n.14 (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1976-77). 
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prosecution of the Postjudgment intervention to assert a 
subrogation interest in an undistributed fund has been allowed 
because the intervenor "was not attempting to reopen or reliti- 
gate any issue which had previously been determined," but was 
raising an issue that could not have been considered until the 
verdicts had been rendered." In addition to allowing postjudg- 
ment intervention to prosecute an appeal or assert a subrogation 
interest, courts have allowed postjudgment intervention when a 
case is remanded for further proceedings after an appealn or when 
the parties affected by a judgment intervene to request a voice 
in shaping the relief to be granted.28 In all these situations the 
intervenor does not seek to consume unnecessary time or expense; 
he desires only the chance to continue where the original party 
left off. 
In contrast to the above situations, postjudgment interven- 
tion has been most often denied where the purpose of the inter- 
vention was to challenge a consent decree, thus prejudicing the 
existing parties by undoing what cost them much time and ex- 
pense to achieve, especially where the intervenors have known or 
should have known of their interest in the action long before they 
in t e r~ened .~~  In general, when an intervenor seeks to raise issues 
that could have been resolved through an earlier intervention, his 
motion to intervene will be held untimely.30 
25. See Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 
505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U S .  777 (1944); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. 
v. Interborough Rapid Transit, 3 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). But see Walpert v. Bart, 
44 F.R.D. 359 (D. Md. 1968). 
26. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1072-73 (5th Cir. 1970). 
27. See Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(per curiam); Atkins v. State Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1969). 
28. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Intervention to gain a voice in shaping 
the relief to be granted may not always be postjudgment, but a t  best is very late prejudg- 
ment intervention. 
29. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Alleghany-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 546 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1977) (per 
curiam); Nevilles v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 511 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 
1975) (per curiam); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
But see Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977) (intervention to  chal- 
lenge a consent decree allowed when intervenors did not know of their interest in the 
action and the district court did not allow notice to be sent); Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 
768 (8th Cir. 1976) (intervention to challenge a consent decree allowed where intervenors 
were unaware that their interests were not adequately represented), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 
914 (1977). 
30. See Iowa State Univ. Research Foundation, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 459 F.2d 447 
(8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
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B. Timeliness and Statutes of Limitation 
One infrequently mentioned but important aspect of the 
timeliness issue is the effect that applicable statutes of limitation 
have on an intervenor's claim. One article has suggested that 
most cases ignore the statute of limitations question and simply 
hold the intervention application to be timely or untimely.31 This 
lack of analysis may not be serious where a court holds an appli- 
cation to be untimely and dismisses it without further comment. 
Where, however, a court allows intervention after the statute has 
run, the adverse parties should be expected to strenuously ob- 
j e ~ t . ~ ~  In fact, in cases where it has been raised, the statute of 
limitations issue has been treated seriously, and the point where 
found to be well taken, has resulted in a bar to an otherwise 
timely inter~ent ion.~~ 
The statute of limitations issue is especially important where 
intervention is sought in an action filed as a class action but 
denied class certification for failure to qualify under Rule 23.34 
When class status is denied, the action may continue as an indi- 
vidual action, but all except the named plaintiffs are excluded 
and must either file their own actions or attempt to intervene in 
the individual action.35 Where the statute of limitations has run 
after the filing of the class action complaint but before denial of 
class certification, all excluded parties will be barred from filing 
their own individual actions, and it appears that they can seek 
relief only by moving to intervene in the individual action that 
was brought before the statute of limitations ran.36 
31. Lederleitner & Nolan, Criteria for Intervention, 1967 U .  ILL. L.F. 299, 301. 
32. The infrequent mention of statutes of limitation may result from the fact that 
an intervenor's requisite interest in an action is so similar to the original party's claim 
that the intervenor's interest is not considered to be a separate claim subject to the statute 
of limitations. See DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826,831 (9th Cir. 
19631, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964). 
33. See Jack v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1958); State Compensa- 
tion Ins. Fund v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Pa. 1955). 
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l): "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so 
maintained." 
35. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-53 (1974); 3B 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 23.50, a t  23-1105 (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1976-77); Proposed 
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 
73, 104 (1966). 
36. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974). "[Tlhere is 
much in the [American Pipe] opinion that suggests that intervention under Rule 24 is 
the only recourse for the class member against whose claim the statute has run during 
the pendency of the class action." 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 23.90[3] n.11 (2d ed. 
1948 & Supp. 1976-77). 
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In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,37 the State of 
Utah filed a private antitrust class action eleven days before expi- 
ration of the applicable statute of limitations. Long after the 
eleven days were past, the district court denied class status for 
failure of the class to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 
23(a)(1).38 Eight days later, sixty of the excluded class members 
moved to intervene as plaintiffs in Utah's action. The district 
court, without weighing the competing considerations for and 
against intervention, found that the intervenors were barred by 
the statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that "the com- 
mencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the stat- 
ute for all purported members of the class who make timely mo- 
tions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate 
for class action status."3g The Court also ruled, however, that the 
limitations period would commence running again after the dis- 
trict court ruled on the suit's class action character. Therefore, 
since the class suit was brought by Utah eleven days before the 
statute ran, the intervenors had only eleven days after denial of 
class status to move for permission to intervene. 
There is hope, however, for a member of a class denied class 
status even if he fails to intervene in the individual action before 
the statute of limitations runs. If the denial of class certification 
is reversed on appeal, the status of class members will be deter- 
mined as of the time the suit was instituted." Thus, the excluded 
party will then be a member of the class and will be able to share 
in any relief eventually granted the class. In view of the impor- 
tance to a putative class member, barred from intervening by the 
statute of limitations, of having the denial of class certification 
reversed where the named plaintiffs have prevailed but have cho- 
sen not to appeal the denial of class status, the question inevita- 
bly arises whether a postjudgment motion to intervene for the 
purpose of appealing this denial of class certification is timely 
under Rule 24 and the applicable statute of limitations. 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that a postjudg- 
37. 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
38. See note 2 supra. 
39. 414 U.S. at 553. 
40. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 n.14 (10th Cir. 19681, cert. denied, 394 U . S .  
928 (1969). See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 433 U.S. 385, 392 (1977); American 
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974). 
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ment motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the denial 
of class certification is timely under Rule 24 if filed within the 
time allowed for an appeal prescribed by Rule 4(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Pr~cedure .~ '  In so holding, the Court first dis- 
posed of United's argument that according to American Pipe the 
intervention was barred by the expired statute of limitations. In 
United's view, Romasanta's class action complaint tolled the 
statute of limitations with respect to McDonald but only until the 
denial of class status for lack of numerosity. At that time the 
statute began to run again with respect to McDonald, so that 
when she sought to intervene three years later, she was barred by 
the statute of limitations." In responding to this argument, Jus- 
tice Stewart, also the author of the Court's opinion in American 
Pipe, wrote: 
This argument might be persuasive if [McDonald] had sought 
to intervene in order to join the named plaintiffs in litigating her 
individual claim based on the illegality of United's no-marriage 
rule, for she then would have occupied the same position as the 
intervenors in American Pipe. 43 
McDonald's intervention, however, was for the entirely different 
purpose of "obtaining appellate review of the district court's 
order denying class action status in the Romasanta lawsuit." 
Justice Stewart noted that the critical fact was that McDon- 
ald sought to intervene as soon as the denial of class status was 
appealable and it became clear that the named plaintiffs would 
not appeal.14 He observed that postjudgment intervention has 
been allowed where "in view of all the circumstances the inter- 
venor acted promptly after the entry of final judgment."" He also 
stated that McDonald was a proper party to appeal since the 
statute of limitations had not run against her a t  the time the class 
action was filed, so that successful reversal of the class certifica- 
41. Rule 4(a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed with the appellate court within 
30 days after the entry of judgment. If, however, the United States is a party, the time is 
extended to 60 days. 
42. 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975) requires employment discrimination com- 
plaints to be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days 
of the occurrence of the discriminatory act. Although McDonald did not have to file a 
complaint with the EEOC since Romasanta had already done so, see note 3 supra, 
United's contention was that she was required to intervene within this 180 day period. 
43. 432 U.S. at 392. 
44. Justice Stewart noted that "[a] rule requiring putative class members who seek 
only to appeal from an order denying class certification to move to intervene shortly after 
entry of that order would serve no purpose." The order would not be appealable until after 
final judgment. Id. a t  394 n. 15. 
45. Id. a t  396. 
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tion denial would create a class of which she was a member. 
Justice Stewart further reasoned that the defendant United was 
not prejudiced by McDonald's late intervention since the lawsuit 
had started as a class action, giving United notice of "both the 
subject matter and size of the prospective litigation."" Moreover, 
although class certification was denied, this did not mean that  
the case must be treated as if i t  had never been filed as a class 
action, Justice Stewart observed. United knew that  the class cer- 
tification denial was appealable after final judgment, and its abil- 
ity to litigate this issue was not prejudiced merely because 
McDonald appealed instead of the named plaintiffs. 
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent,47 argued that the ma- 
jority opinion supplemented the American Pipe rule with "a 
novel tolling rule applicable only to intervention for the purpose 
of appealing the denial of class status" and that there was "no 
justification for [such an] extension, either in precedent or pol- 
icy."" Although he acknowledged the fact that intervention was 
sought for a purpose different from that in American Pipe, Justice 
Powell claimed that the majority had not explained the relevance 
of this difference. He challenged the majority's basic assumption 
that the filing of a class action, even though later denied class 
status, gave the defendant notice of the claims against him and 
gave the unnamed class members a right to rely on the named 
plaintiff to appeal the denial of class status. Instead, Justice Pow- 
ell maintained that the denial of class status should strip the 
action of its class action character, thereby both putting putative 
class members on notice that they may no longer rely on the 
named plaintiffs to protect their rights and putting the defendant 
on notice that he may rely on settlements with the named plain- 
tiffs to terminate the action. Therefore, once class status is de- 
nied, excluded class members must seek to intervene or file their 
own actions before the statute of limitations expires, Justice Pow- 
ell contended. Assuming intervention is sought within the limita- 
tions period, the district court would still need to exercise its 
discretion in determining the motion's timeliness under Rule 24. 
This approach, Justice Powell observed, would help define the 
contours of the nonclass action early in the litigation, "thus 
speeding its ultimate reso l~ t ion . "~~  
46. Id. at 392-93 (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U S .  538, 555 
(1974)). 
47. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined Justice Powell's dissent. 
48. Id. at 398 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 403 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court allowed Mrs. McDonald to transform an 
individual action into a class action after litigation on the merits. 
The procedural device she used was a postjudgment intervention 
for the purpose of appealing the district court's denial of class 
status. This analysis will explain how a motion to intervene after 
judgment can be held timely and will examine whether, regard- 
less of the motion's timeliness, such intervention in a plaintiffs' 
class action will have a more prejudicial effect on the defendant 
than other existing procedures. This section will also show both 
that postjudgment motions to intervene for the purpose of appeal 
may be timely and that such intervention may transform individ- 
ual actions into class actions. When such a transformation occurs, 
however, it is, as this analysis shows, because of existing rules on 
the appealability of class determination orders and not because 
of any court-sanctioned laxity or opportunism of unnamed parties 
to a denied class action. 
A. Timeliness of Postjudgment Motions to Intervene 
1. Statute  of limitations 
Although both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court 
characterized the issue as whether the motion to intervene was 
timely under Rule 24, United's first contention was that McDon- 
ald's intervention was barred by the statute of limitations be- 
cause the tolling rule of American Pipe should apply to all class 
actions." Under American Pipe, if the class certification fails for 
lack of numerosity, "the commencement of the original class suit 
tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the 
class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has 
found the suit inappropriate for class status."51 The American 
Pipe rule, however, indicates only when the statute is to be tolled 
and not when it will commence running again. This holding thus 
could be read as saying that after the statute is so tolled it re- 
mains tolled, and timely motions to intervene will be granted any 
time the discretionary timeliness requirement of Rule 24 is satis- 
fied. 
American Pipe, however, did specify when the statute of lim- 
itations would commence running again, but i t  expressly limited 
this pronouncement to an interpretation of section 5(b) of the 
50. Brief for Petitioner United Air Lines, Inc., at 10-18. 
51. 414 U.S. at 553. 
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Clayton the statute of limitations applicable there. The 
Court held that since the Clayton Act required that the statute 
of limitations be tolled only during the pendency of government 
litigation, "[tlhe same concept leads to the conclusion that the 
commencement of the class action in this case suspended the 
running of the limitation period only during the pendency of the 
motion to strip the suit of its class action ~ h a r a c t e r . " ~ ~  After the 
denial of class status, the statute of limitations began to run 
again. The American Pipe rule as to when the statute is tolled is 
thus considerably broader than the rule as to when the statute 
will commence running again." Additionally, the purpose of the 
intervention in American Pipe was not to dispute the class action 
certification denial as in the instant case; rather, the intervenors' 
purpose was to prosecute their individual claims as coplaintiffs. 
Since the purpose for which intervention is sought is relevant in 
determining whether the motion to intervene could have been 
more appropriately made earlier,55 American Pipe is not strong 
authority for barring intervention in the present case. 
American Pipe is, however, illustrative of the courts' power 
to toll federal statutes of limitation. In American Pipe, the Court 
stated that although statutes of limitation are substantive rights 
not extendable by rules of procedure, federal courts are not re- 
stricted from holding "that the statute of limitations is tolled 
under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative + 
purpose."56 Thus, American Pipe, far from being an obstacle to 
the holding in the instant case, was actually a step toward the 
ruling that the limitations period embodied in federal statutes 
may be tolled for other reasons not inconsistent with the legisla- 
tive purpose. 
52. 15 U.S.C. 9 16(b) (1970). 
53. 414 U.S. at 561. 
54. For a strict application of the American Pipe rule as to when the statute of 
limitations will commence running again, see Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil 
Co., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975). Monarch, like American Pipe, only concerned 4 5(b) 
of the Clayton Act. 
The Seventh Circuit in the instant case distinguished American Pipe as follows: "The 
specific holding in American Pipe that the statute of limitations . . . begins to run anew 
if the motion is denied is not applicable here. The statute of limitations in Title VII actions 
is suspended once one member of the class initiates the grievance mechanism." 537 F.2d 
at 918 n.6. 
55. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see note 62 infra. 
56. 414 U.S. at 559. 
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2. Rule 24 timeliness 
Although the statute of limitations does not bar intervention 
here, motions to intervene must still be timely under Rule 24.57 
I t  is well established that postjudgment motions to intervene 
have been held timely.58 It is also true that prejudice to the origi- 
nal parties is perhaps the strongest reason for not allowing late 
interventions." In order to understand how a motion to intervene 
after judgment can be held timely and therefore not prejudicial 
to the original parties, the sources of prejudice to the original 
parties that  may arise from intervention must be separated. Prej- 
udice to existing parties may arise either frorn the delay in mov- 
ing to intervene or from the results of the intervention itself. The 
Rule 24 timeliness requirement has been applied only to the prej- 
udice arising from the intervenor's delay in moving to intervene, 
not to the general prejudice to opposing parties of having an 
intervening party's rights asserted against them.60 Indeed, any 
lawsuit is a great inconvenience and is often "prejudicial" to the 
defendant. But such prejudice does not bar lawsuits unless it 
results from a delay in bringing the action-delay being defined 
by the applicable statute of limitations or the timeliness require- 
ment of Rule 24. 
Prejudice from delay in moving to intervene results from 
raising new issues that could have been considered earlier? In 
order for there to be a delay, there must have been some earlier 
time when the issues raised by the intervention could have been 
handled. A postjudgment motion to intervene to appeal is not 
delayed since there was no earlier time when an appeal could 
have been taken.62 Intervention for this purpose is no different in 
57. See note 10 supra. 
58. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra. 
59. See note 16 supra. 
60. See Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 1977). The prejudice 
to an opposing party caused by having an intervening party's rights asserted against him 
should be controlled by the other requirements of Rule 24 that must be met before inter- 
vention will be allowed. 
61. See text accompanying note 30 supra. 
62. Although Justice Powell recognized the majority's distinction between McDon- 
ald's purpose in intervening solely to appeal the denial of class status and the purpose in 
American Pipe of intervening to litigate as coplaintiffs, he claimed that the majority failed 
to explain the relevance of this difference in purpose. Once it is seen that the prejudice 
from intervention must result from delay in moving to intervene, the relevance of the 
purpose for which intervention is sought becomes immediately apparent. Since delay can 
only result from failure to raise an issue that could have been more appropriately raised 
earlier, it is necessary to consider the issues sought to be raised, namely the purpose of 
the intervention. 
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terms of the action's continuity from the prosecution of an appeal 
by the original party. No step of the action is repeated or delayed. 
The only prejudice an opposing party could claim from a post- 
judgment motion to intervene to carry forward an appeal would 
be that without such intervention he would not have had to de- 
fend an appeal or suffer the consequences of a reversal. Such 
prejudice, however, does not result from the delay in the appli- 
cant's motion to intervene but rather from the effect of the inter- 
vention itself. The opposing party should not be able to assert the 
prejudicial effects of allowing the intervention as a reason for 
holding the motion to intervene untimely. The fact that a post- 
judgment motion to intervene for the purpose of appeal raises 
an issue that could not have been considered earlier clearly shows 
that whatever its disadvantages, such a motion is not untimely.63 
Perhaps the strongest argument the dissent raised against 
the timeliness of this postjudgment intervention was that al- 
though intervention to appeal the denial of class status could not 
have been more appropriately raised earlier, McDonald could 
have moved to intervene to litigate the action as a coplaintiff as 
soon as class status was denied. In short, postjudgment interven- 
tion to appeal the denial of class status is untimely, since inter- 
vention as a coplaintiff could have been sought earlier. Justice 
Powell based this argument on the assumption that the denial of 
class status "strips" the action of its class action character, thus 
putting putative class members on notice that they may no longer 
rely on the named plaintiffs to protect their rights and putting 
defendants on notice that they may settle with the named plain- 
tiffs. Under this reasoning, the excluded class members must 
either intervene as named plaintiffs or possibly file individual 
actions soon after the denial of class status. 
The majority, on the other hand, assumed that an order de- 
nying class status does not mean that the action must be treated 
as though a class action had never been brought. Rather, the 
filing of a class complaint gives the unnamed class members a 
right to rely on the named plaintiffs to appeal the denial of class 
status until it becomes clear that the named plaintiffs will not do 
63. Although the opposing party may not be able to claim prejudice from the timing 
of a postjudgment motion to intervene, the intervenor arguably should not be allowed the 
"free ride" that results from allowing the nonadverse party to finance the cost of winning 
the lawsuit while permitting the intervenor to reap the benefits of a successful judgment. 
This "free ride" prejudice, however, can be alleviated by assigning a portion of the litiga- 
tion costs to the intervenor. "[Sluch a solution would be an appropriate response to the 
'free ride' problem, for it would prevent the problem instead of preventing the 
intervention." McDonald v. E.J.  Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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so, at  which time a prompt motion to intervene will be held 
timely. Furthermore, the lateness of such intervention should not 
prejudice the defendant since he was notified by the filing of the 
class complaint of the possible claims against him. In effect, as 
Justice Powell pointed out in his dissent, the timeliness of post- 
judgment intervention to appeal a denial of class status depends 
on which assumption as to the consequences of the district 
court's denial is adopted.64 Although Justice Powell cited several 
sources supporting his a s s u m p t i ~ n , ~ ~  the majority's assumption 
seems to be the stronger for two reasons. 
First, as long as a denial of class status is appealable, the 
unnamed, excluded class members who did not intervene to be- 
come named plaintiffs have an interest in the action that only the 
named plaintiffs can protect. That interest is having the named 
plaintiffs prevail on the merits and appeal the denial of class 
status. Assuming the validity of the class, which a reversal on 
appeal of the denial of class status would presumably verify, i t  
would seem that the class members should have some means to 
participate in the named plaintiffs' successful judgment. Al- 
though they may not rely on the successful named plaintiffs to 
bear the time and expense of an appeal, the excluded class mem- 
bers should be able to intervene to appeal the order themselves 
as long as the defendant is not prejudiced by the time of such 
intervention. Since the defendant received full notice of these 
claims against him by the filing of the original class complaint, 
and since his ability to defend against the appeal is not affected 
by which party appeals, he is not prejudiced by the time the 
motion to intervene is made. 
Second, if postjudgment intervention for purpose of appeal 
were untimely so that only the named plaintiffs could appeal the 
class status denial, the named plaintiffs could agree with the 
defendant, who had ample notice of the excluded class members' 
interest in appealing, not to appeal in return for a much more 
favorable settlement than they could otherwise command. In ef- 
fect, the named plaintiffs would be receiving part of the excluded 
64. See 432 U.S. a t  399 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
65. Justice Powell relied primarily on the Advisory Committee's Note on the 1966 
amendment to Rule 23(c)(l) which said that "[a] negative [class status] determination 
means that the action should be stripped of its character as a class action." Proposed 
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 
73, 104 (1966). He also relied on the Court's decision in American Pipe requiring the 
intervenors to intervene in the individual action before the statute of limitations ran. In 
American Pipe, however, the intervenors were not attempting to appeal the denial of class 
status, unlike the intervenor in the instant case. 
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members' compensation. This is more like a "sellout"66 than a 
settlement. On the other hand, if the defendant knew that a 
settlement with the named plaintiffs would not end all possibility 
of an appeal, he could a t  least by settlement end the litigation 
as to the named plaintiff. Thus, settlements, which are highly 
favored in the law,67 would not be significantly deterred. Further- 
more, a settlement that only satisfies the named plaintiffs' claims 
without eliminating the possibility of a reversal of the class status 
denial would be more likely to reflect only the value of the named 
plaintiffs' claims and not the additional value to the defendant 
of ridding himself of all the excluded class members' claims. 
This danger of sellout-type settlements, combined with the 
adequate notice the defendant has of the claims of excluded class 
members and their strong interest in seeing the class status denial 
appealed, indicates that the representative nature of the action 
should not end with the district court's denial of class status. 
Rather, the action's representative nature should continue a t  
least until the putative class members know that the named 
plaintiffs will not appeal, a t  which time a prompt intervention 
should be allowed. Any prejudice to the defendant arising from 
such intervention comes not from the timing of the motion to 
intervene but from the effects of allowing the intervention. 
B. Ef fec ts  o f  Postjudgment Intervention 
Showing that  a postjudgment intervention for purpose of 
appeal may be timely does not end the inquiry of whether it 
should be allowed. For intervention is only a procedural device to 
achieve some other end. Under Rule 24(b), a district court may 
deny even a timely motion for permissive intervention where the 
intervention would "prejudice the adjudication of the rights of 
the original parties.'-'68 Since the Federal Rules are to "be con- 
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
66. See Brief for Respondent Liane Buix McDonald a t  33. This danger was mentioned 
by the Seventh Circuit in its reversal of the district court. See 537 F.2d a t  919. 
67. See, e.g., Pearson v.  Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976). 
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b). See note 13 supra. 
The dissent in the instant case accused the majority of eliminating the discretion 
accorded the district court which had denied the motion to intervene. Although Justice 
Stewart did not specifically address this objection, he did treat it in American Pipe: 
"[The district court's] determination was not an exercise of discretion, but rather a 
conclusion of law which the Court of Appeals correctly found to be erroneous." 414 US. 
at 560. In effect, appellate courts may reverse not only for abuse of discretion but also for 
failure to exercise any discretion a t  all. 
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of every action,"69 the effect of procedural rules should be to mini- 
mize the possibility of any party prevailing by taking advantage 
of a procedural rule and to maximize the probability of a party 
prevailing on the basis of his substantive rights. In short, the 
desired effect is a procedural balance of power between the oppos- 
ing parties. Postjudgment intervention for the purpose of appeal- 
ing a denial of class status should therefore be allowed if such 
intervention will preserve the excluded class members' cause of 
action without putting the defendant in any worse position than 
the existing procedural rules have already placed him. 
The effect of a postjudgment intervention by an excluded 
class member for the purpose of appealing the denial of class 
status will be an appellate review of the class status issue. Such 
review may result in a reversal of the class status denial after the 
merits of the case have been tried in an individual action. Post- 
judgment intervention, however, is not the only way that deter- 
mined individuals may appeal the class status denial and turn 
the action into a class action after final judgment. The named 
plaintiffs themselves may appeal the denial of class status. A 
plaintiff who has not settled with the defendant but has prevailed 
on the merits may wish to obtain class status for the action in 
order to share attorneys' fees or to generally vindicate his class. 
Even if the named plaintiffs do not appeal, there may be numer- 
ous parties who filed prejudgment protective motions to intervene 
solely to appeal an adverse class determination because they were 
not willing to rely on the named plaintiffs' willingness to do 
Even if the adverse class determination is never appealed, a 
defendant may effectively be made liable to an entire class 
through an individual action in two other ways. First, there may 
be other parties whose statutes of limitation have not expired who 
will file new actions and seek to use collateral estoppel offensively 
to win a summary judgment relying on the determination of lia- 
bility in the first case." Second, there is the possibility that the 
court itself may grant class relief. In the Sprogis case, the Seventh 
Circuit determined that the district court could use its discretion 
in granting relief to the whole class even though the action was 
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
70. See note 77 infra. 
71. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 934 (1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D. 
Wash. 1962), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 
379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Sullivan, The Enforcement of Title VII: 
Meshing Public and Private Efforts, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 526-31 (1976). 
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an individual The district court in Sprogis, however, chose 
not to grant class relief.73 Although this procedure was discredited 
in the Fifth Cir~uit , '~ it still remains a possibility in the Seventh 
Circuit. 
These possibilities make it unrealistic to say that but for 
postjudgment intervention to appeal the class status denial, the 
defendant would not have to defend every suit as if it were a class 
action. Where a defendant has committed an act violating the 
rights of a large number of people, there will be potential liability 
to all those people. The defendant must therefore vigorously de- 
fend the issue of liability even in an individual action because the 
existing procedural rules allow other claimants to take advantage 
of any determination of his liability. United, the defendant in the 
Sprogis case, contested vigorously but unsuccessfully that it had 
no liability to stewardesses discharged under the no-marriage 
rule. Since then it has rightfully used every legitimate procedural 
device in an attempt to reduce the number of plaintiffs able to 
benefit from that judgment. To prohibit postjudgment interven- 
tion by the plaintiff who chose to win or lose with the class cuts 
off a valid claim without eliminating the uncertainty as to the 
extent of United's liability. 
C. Effect of the Nonappealability of Class Determination 
Orders Until After Final Judgment 
Much of the uncertainty concerning the defendant's liability 
in a plaintiffs' class action could be eliminated by allowing inter- 
locutory appeals of the class certification order. A final determi- 
nation of the action's class character before adjudication on the 
merits would give the defendant a clear picture of his potential 
liability and of the parties with whom he would have to settle. 
Although Rule 23 mandates that district courts determine class 
status as soon as possible, the provision also states that class 
determination orders "may be conditional and may be altered or 
amended before the decision on the merits."75 Appellate courts, 
therefore, will usually not hear appeals of orders denying class 
status until after final j~dgment. '~ Where the class determination 
72. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 404 
U.S. 991 (1971). 
73. 56 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
74. See Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Go., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971). 
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(~)(1). 
76. See, e.g., Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 907 (1976); Cotten v. Treasure Lake, Inc., 518 F.2d 770 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
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order is not appealable until after final judgment, the defendant 
is faced with the possibility of a postjudgment transformation of 
an individual action to a class action. 
The dissent's approach, barring the use of postjudgment in- 
tervention to raise the class status issue on appeal, would have 
little impact on the defendant's uncertainty as to the extent of 
his liability. Although the dissent's approach would have effec- 
tively excluded the intervenor in the present case, it would not 
have excluded any intervenor who, immediately after denial of 
class status, filed a protective motion to intervene to appeal this 
denial should the named plaintiffs fail to do so.77 Although the 
dissent in the Seventh Circuit's disposition of the case accused 
McDonald of "sit[ting] back and allow[ing] others to assume 
the costs and risks in prosecuting their individual actions,"78 an 
intervenor who merely files a protective motion to intervene 
should the named plaintiffs not appeal is not exerting a signifi- 
cantly greater effort than one who first intervenes after judgment. 
Regardless of any laxity on the intervenor's part, the defendant 
is still threatened with a postjudgment transformation of the in- 
dividual action to a class action because the class determination 
order is not immediately a ~ p e a l a b l e . ~ ~  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The present case, although seeming to stretch the policies of 
statutes of limitation and Rule 24 timeliness beyond recognition, 
does not represent a radical departure from the current law on the 
timeliness of intervention. A motion to intervene solely to appeal 
a .denial of class status is timely when made promptly after an 
appeal becomes available. Although the effect achieved by such 
postjudgment intervention-a postjudgment transformation of 
an individual action into a class action-seems unusual, as long 
423 U S .  930 (1975). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
395 U.S. 977 (1969). See generally 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 23.97 (2d ed. 1948 & 
Supp. 1976-77); Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 
70 COLUM. L. REV. 1929 (1970). 
77. Both the majority and the dissent in the instant case recognized the possibility 
that excluded class members could file a protective motion to intervene solely to appeal 
a denial of class status should the named plaintiffs not do so. See 432 U.S. at 394 n.15 
(majority opinion), 402 (dissenting opinion). 
78. 537 F.2d at  922 (dissenting opinion). 
79. The effect of a postjudgment transformation of a Title VII action to a class action 
could be alleviated by limiting the relief in such a case to an injunction against the 
discriminatory practice. Only those who intervened before the statute of limitations ran 
would be entitled to backpay. Sullivan, supra note 71, at 494. 
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as a class certification order is not reviewable until after final 
judgment, the mere filing of a class complaint will create a t  least 
the right to appeal an adverse class determination. Such an ap- 
peal may freely be taken by the named plaintiffs and all unnamed 
class members who filed protective motions to intervene. Prohib- 
iting the postjudgment intervention would only close the back 
door while leaving the front door wide open. 
